

26 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Notes on Briefing of NSC by Secretary of State Regarding
Berlin Conference

- This needs
explanation
All*
1. The USSR will not relax its hold on any areas it now controls; it may pretend to do so if this tactic should permit it to gain further territory.
 2. No agreement could be reached on the neutralization of either Germany or Austria. Neutralization was not regarded as an acceptable substitute for EDC.
 3. The Soviets completely disregarded German public opinion -- and Austrian as well -- making no attempts during the conference to play to either people.
 4. It was clear that Molotov's main effort was to defeat EDC, pretending that if EDC could be set aside, all other problems could easily be solved. To replace EDC, Molotov offered an All-European Pact with the U. S. and Communist China in the role of observers. The Pact would include 32 states; no list of all the 32 states was ever given, but to reach that number one would have to include the Baltic states, White Russia, the Ukraine and possibly one of the the Caucasus Republics, in addition to the USSR itself.
 5. It was clear that the USSR was out to dominate Europe and Asia, and might leave to the U. S. the domination of the Western Hemisphere. (This is reminiscent of the Nazi-Soviet conferences in 1939 and 1940. In this connection, the President asked if it would not be possible to do something with the German documents which we recovered after the war, and which the Soviet Union knows are in our hands.)
 6. During the conference, a great deal of difficulty was encountered over the right of a unified Germany to renounce adherence to EDC (Article 7, Bonn Treaty). Molotov raised this point frequently, to the embarrassment of Western representatives.

NSC No Objection to Declassification and Release Instructions on File

7. Britain and France were unwilling to take as strong a position as the U. S. regarding the defense of Berlin. They would agree on this matter only to the extent of making a joint visit with the U. S. to the Mayor of Berlin; Mr. Dulles' statement on defending Berlin was consequently unilaterally made.

8. The nature of the relationship between Soviet Russia and Communist China is such that apparently the USSR cannot give orders to China, but must treat China as a partner to be consulted and sometimes to require restraint.


9. It was surprising that the matter of East-West Trade was not pressed at Berlin to the extent that it could have been; it was scarcely mentioned at all.

10. The Secretary of State believed that the conference on the Far East will take a long time. The issues are less clear and there will be considerable difficulty in obtaining agreement on the countries which are to attend.

with
caused
the
Dulles
China
talks

During the Dulles-Molotov talks regarding the Eisenhower proposal for peaceful uses of atomic energy, Mr. Dulles indicated that it would be appropriate -- in any international conference on this subject -- to have powers attend which supplied fissionable materials -- such as Belgium and the Union of South Africa. Mr. Molotov replied that ~~on that basis~~, the USSR would wish to invite Communist China.

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- ① USSR will not relax its hold
on any area now held. May
pretend to do so - if it can get more.
- ② No agreement on neutralization
either of Austria or Germany -
- ③ Neutralization not acceptable

Submitted to ENC -

- ④ USSR disregards former
public opinion -
- ⑤ M's main effort. Defeat ENC
(if so pretended all else could be
solved)

⑥ All European part - 32 state

③ - USSR & German Empire

Area - USA - WH.

⑦ Query - Report of Unfused

German to report ENC -

⑧ City of Berlin - B + F not
as they are -

④ Relation Sov R - Ch. comes.

USSR can't give orders, Treats as
partner to be consulted + needs
to be restrained -

⑩ East west trade -

Does China ⁼ have
any fissile materials still
being exported :-